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This online colloquium has been established to discuss Arash
Abizadeh’s recent book, Hobbes and Two Faces of Ethics
[https://www.cambridge.org/gb/academic/subjects/philosophy/early-
modern-philosophy/hobbes-and-two-faces-ethics?
format=HB] . We began with an introduction
[http://www.europeanhobbessociety.org/general/online-
colloquium-1-introduction-to-hobbes-and-the-two-faces-of-
ethics/] to the text by Professor Abizadeh. We now have a
response from Sandra Field [https://www.yale-
nus.edu.sg/about/faculty/sandra-field/] (Yale-NUS), which
will be followed by responses from Michael LeBuffe
[http://www.europeanhobbessociety.org/general/online-
colloquium-3-lebuffe-on-hobbes-and-the-two-faces-of-
ethics/] (Otago) and Daniel Eggers (Köln), and finally a
reply by Arash Abizadeh. Many thanks to Cambridge
University Press for supporting this colloquium.
December 21, 2018 / in Discussion, Features, General, Member
Publications / by admin
Home / Discussion / Online Colloquium (2): Field on Hobbes and the Two Faces of Ethics
 Abizadeh’s Hobbes and the Two Faces of Ethics is an
ambitious book. It seeks to provide a comprehensive
interpretation of Hobbes’s ethics, and to make that
interpretation speak equally to historians of ideas as to
contemporary metaethics and normative ethics. There is
much to admire in the execution of this project. Abizadeh is
relentless in parsing fine distinctions amongst contemporary
readings of Hobbes, and in deploying textual evidence from
across Hobbes’s oeuvre to support his favoured view. And the
ends to which this rigour and precision are deployed are
intellectually significant. Abizadeh identifies a bifurcation
between the good and the right in Hobbes’s normative ethics
—on the one hand, a natural law representing an ethics of
individual prudence; on the other hand, a model of justice
representing a juridical morality of interpersonal obligation—
claiming that both are genuinely, but independently,
normative. This interpretation is controversial but ultimately
compelling, and historically illuminating. I found his analysis
of the genuine normativity of the ethics of individual self-
interested prudence particularly useful; Abizadeh diagnoses a
certain narrowness of current philosophical conceptions of
morality as the obstacle to appreciating this normativity (10,
219–23).
My critical comments focus on Abizadeh’s central metaethical
claim: that Hobbes offers a sophisticated ethical naturalism,
one which is neither reductionist or noncognitivist (17–19,
61). While the bulk of Abizadeh’s discussion is devoted to
exegesis, at no point in the book does Abizadeh indicate
finding the position to be problematic or incoherent. Thus, I
take it that Abizadeh’s goal is not merely to establish that
Hobbes held this view, but also to commend such a view as
being sufficiently philosophically compelling and appealing to
merit our present attention. I will try to articulate the
enduring difficulties facing such a view, both on Hobbes’s
own terms and for us.
Abizadeh’s starting point is the puzzle of the apparent
incompatibility between Hobbes’s materialist mechanistic
metaphysics and his normative philosophy (7–8). One might
think that in a materialist metaphysics, lacking free will, there
can only be causal responsibility and instrumental sanctions
(like rewards and punishments for animals), not genuine
moral responsibility. But to the contrary, Abizadeh argues
that this is a medieval scholastic prejudice: aligning Hobbes
with the earlier Aristotelian view, we see that the possibility of
attributing genuine moral responsibility relies not on the
possession of free will, but on the capacity for reason (183–
87, 213). Might one then object that that in a materialist
metaphysics, reason itself is deflated, becoming a merely
passive mental process? Again, to the contrary, Abizadeh
argues that it is possible for one’s reasoning to be active, by
which he means capable of reflecting on and being guided by
reasons (62–65, 93).
Abizadeh’s response to worries about Hobbes’s naturalism
ultimately relies on identifying a capacity for active reasoning.
Hobbes and Abizadeh distinguish having a capacity for
reason from exercising that capacity: there are people with
weak understanding, unclear thoughts, countervailing
motivations, and so on, and correspondingly people often fail
to fulfil their moral responsibilities. But how is the distinction
between possessing an unexercised capacity versus simply
lacking the capacity to be specified? And given Hobbes’s
determinist view of causation, how can the salience of such a
distinction be upheld?
Abizadeh does not provide an explicit account, so let us turn
to Hobbes’s general metaphysics of bodies. Hobbes makes
clear that at a fundamental level, nothing is truly contingent:
an act is either determined to occur, or it is not. The
possibility of an act does not mean its contingency, but rather
that the act is not impossible: at some point of time a full set
of determinate causes will converge such that it will in fact
occur (AW 37.5). This view of possibility generates a
fundamentally un-Aristotelian understanding of capacity. As
Hobbes explains in the course of criticising his Aristotelian
opponent’s view: ‘We may say … that an axe can cut because
there is nothing in the axe that stops it from cutting. Yet there
may well be, in the nature of things, causes that make it
impossible for the axe—or anything else—ever to be picked
up, and as a result the axe cannot cut’ (AW 37.11). Thus, it is
not the inner properties of a thing which specify its capacities,
but its place in an actual web of deterministic causes: if
determinate causes mean a putative capacity is never
exercised, it turns out that it is no capacity at all. In our
ignorance of the future, more loosely and derivatively we
might call an act possible when it may (for all we know)
occur; correspondingly we might attribute a capacity or power
to produce that act. (DCo 10.5; AW 35.6–10). This is harmless
enough, so long as we bear in mind the strict meaning of
possibility: if there are reasons to think that the act will not
occur, then it is not permissible to attribute capacity or power
for that act.
Is Hobbes’s discussion of the human capacity for reason, and
correspondingly of the human capacity to feel the rational
force of obligations, compatible with this anti-
Aristotelianism? At face value, it is compatible. After all,
Hobbes and Abizadeh are careful not to attribute a capacity
for reason in certain cases where it predictably will not be put
into practice (19, 122, 136). Children and the mad are ruled
out; and even amongst sane adults, the attribution of
normative obligations requires that the relevant reasons are
epistemically and motivationally accessible (in particular,
ruling out normative obligations to act in extreme
contravention to one’s own wellbeing, for instance any
purported obligation to obey a command to kill oneself or
one’s parent). And outside of these cases, individuals (for all
we know) may reason and act well, so we may permissibly
attribute full capacity for reason and full moral responsibility,
which is exactly what Abizadeh proposes doing.
However, against appearances, I would suggest that Hobbes’s
ethics’ extensive reliance on the human capacity for reason
and corresponding rational action is deeply problematic on
his own terms. The problem comes into view once we shift the
analytical lens from humans considered individually to the
domain of sociological reflection. At the scale of society, we
can see poor reasoning and poor behaviour arising
predictably from certain aspects of the social domain, even
when subjects are not facing the kind of extreme threat to
their wellbeing outlined above. Under certain social
conditions, it is predictable that a proportion of the
population will steal (for instance, when law enforcement is
imperfect and there is a stark gap between rich and poor).
Under certain social conditions, it is predictable that a
proportion of the population will rationalise unjust conduct
(for instance, when gratifying rhetoric connects with feelings
of grievance or dissatisfaction). (See DC Chapter 12; L
Chapter 29). In this light, while it may be fair to say that for
all we know, a particular individual will behave rationally
and fulfil their obligations, it is not fair to say that for all we
know, everyone will do so. Thus, to say that all sane adult
members of a population have the Hobbesian ‘capacity’ to
reason aright and to fulfil their obligations seems untenable.
The tension is brought to the fore in the discussion of
punishment. Abizadeh wants to reject the view by which
materialist metaphysics requires a merely strategic attitude to
practices of blame and punishment (in terms of salutary
sociological and political effects, not in terms of genuine
moral responsibility). On Abizadeh’s reading, certainly, for
Hobbes it is necessary that such practices do have salutary
effects (this explains his opposition to vengeful punishment).
But strategic usefulness alone is not sufficient: those breaking
the law are truly morally responsible for their action, in light
of their rational capacity. Therefore punishment is also
morally important mode of expressing this second-person
holding responsible (21, 203–9). Perhaps this is textually
accurate (although it seems to me that Hobbes’s own defence
of blame and punishment rests rather more heavily on its
salutary strategic effects than Abizadeh’s reconstruction
would suggest, see LN 248–55). But I want to underscore the
unappealing, and perhaps incoherent, commitment this kind
of naturalism involves. It seeks still to blame people for bad
behaviour, even if it is the sociologically predictable result of
certain social conditions. It lays deep moral responsibility on
the individual and obscures the larger web of causes in which
individual action occurs. The political consequence is holding
communities responsible for sociologically predictable
dysfunction.
Perhaps Abizadeh’s moralised naturalism, with its
concomitant individualisation of responsibility and refusal of
the ambiguities of agency, is the genuine legacy of Hobbes’s
political philosophy, and the correct all-things-considered
interpretation of his texts. But first, I wonder about its
coherence: it is not clear to me that it fully addresses the
challenge of a materialist metaphysics. Abizadeh
comprehensively addresses one possible tension (how
naturalism fits with the possibility of moral truths and the
possibility of active reasoning) without addressing adequately
another tension (how complex causal determinism fits with
the attribution of moral blame). And second, it is far from
clear why Hobbes’s moralised naturalism merits being
promoted over the thoroughgoing materialist undercurrent of
Hobbes that Abizadeh rejects. According to this more
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subversive undercurrent, political and sociological reflection
on the determinate causes of human conduct should
complicate the easy attribution of a capacity for moral and
just action, and give us pause to reflect on the broader
determinate causes helping or inhibiting the development of
such capacity.
Sandra Field (Yale-NUS College)
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